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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff Daniel C. Motley, a former New Jersey State 
Trooper, was seriously injured on the job. Although he 
continued working as a Detective for several years after the 
accident, Motley was denied promotions because he was 
unable to complete the required annual physical 
examination. Eventually, Motley voluntarily took an 
accidental disability retirement, which included enhanced 
pension benefits. Thereafter, Motley sued the New Jersey 
State Police and others who are not parties to this appeal, 
alleging that by refusing to promote him for failing to pass 
the physical exam, the State Police discriminated against 
him on the basis of a physical handicap in violation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq. 
("ADA"), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 10:5-1 et seq. ("NJLAD"). The District 
Court granted summary judgment to the State Police, 
ruling that Motley's prior admission of permanent and total 
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disability during the disability application process judicially 
estopped him from asserting that he was qualified for the 
job he sought. We will affirm, not because he was estopped, 
but because Motley was simply not entitled to survive 
summary judgment in light of his prior assertions of total 
disability, and his failure to adequately reconcile his wholly 
inconsistent positions. 
 
I. 
 
The facts of this case are undisputed, unless otherwise 
noted. This case arises as a result of an incident in 
January 1990 in which Motley was seriously injured while 
on duty. In the course of a drug buy-bust operation, Motley 
sustained serious injuries to his knees, back, neck, 
shoulder, and left eye when the accused attempted to 
escape and dragged Motley approximately 150 feet with his 
car until crashing into a pole. 
 
Motley had joined the police force in 1982, and was 
promoted to Detective II in 1989. Since 1988, the New 
Jersey State Police has required that its officers participate 
in an annual physical examination.1 The rules provided 
that any officer who did not satisfactorily complete the 
physical examination would not be eligible for promotion.2 
As a result of the injuries sustained in the January 1990 
incident, Motley was placed on temporary limited duty 
status. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The State Police justified this exam by noting that officers could be 
exposed to violent confrontations at any time, and that it was therefore 
necessary that the officers be physically able to respond to these 
situations to protect members of the public. This examination consisted 
of various physical activities. In addition to flexibility and body 
composition assessments, the officers were required to run 1.5 miles in 
13 minutes, do 34 sit-ups in two minutes, and do 32 push-ups in two 
minutes. If an employee was unable to run, swimming or biking tests 
could be substituted. 
 
2. The rules did not automatically exclude those officers who were 
suffering from temporary medical or physiological problems from 
consideration for promotion. Instead, the Police Superintendent 
considered their eligibility for promotion on a case-by-case basis. 
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Motley did not participate in the annual physical 
examination after he was injured in the 1990 incident. 
Between May 1990 and May 1991, Motley's performance 
was evaluated and he was not recommended for promotion 
to the rank of Detective I because he did not pass the 
fitness test. In August 1991, Motley filed a grievance 
claiming that he was entitled to the promotion because he 
had the requisite service time. Motley received no answer to 
his grievance, and he was subsequently not recommended 
for promotion in 1992 and 1993. 
 
On April 7, 1993, Motley applied for an accidental 
disability pension. New Jersey law allows this benefit to be 
granted to a State Police officer provided that a medical 
board determines that the officer is "permanently and 
totally disabled . . . and . . . physically incapacitated for the 
performance of his usual duties" as a consequence of an 
event that occurred as a result of the officer's duties. N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 53:5A-10(a). In his application, Motley declared 
that he was qualified for the enhanced disability pension 
benefits because he was "permanently and totally 
incapacitated" as a result of the January 1990 incident. 
The medical board concurred and found that Motley was 
permanently and totally incapacitated for "State Police 
Officer duties." The State Police did not challenge this 
determination. Thereafter, Motley's application for an 
accidental disability retirement pension was granted by the 
Division of Pensions, and Motley continues to receive 
monthly disability payments. 
 
Motley commenced this action under the ADA and 
NJLAD. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
the State Police, ruling that Motley's prior assertion that he 
was totally and permanently disabled judicially estopped 
him from suing under the ADA and NJLAD because he 
could not demonstrate that he was otherwise qualified for 
the job. 
 
II. 
 
We have the opportunity in this case to address the effect 
of our prior holding in McNemar, 91 F.3d at 610. As we 
have previously noted, McNemar has generated a great deal 
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of academic and judicial criticism. See Krouse v. American 
Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 502 n.3 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 
the criticism). Much of the criticism is based on the 
mistaken belief that McNemar announced a per se rule that 
a claim for disability, based on an assertion of a total 
disability or inability to work, necessarily bars an individual 
from pursuing an ADA discrimination claim. McNemar 
announced no such per se rule.3 
 
McNemar correctly declared that application of judicial 
estoppel requires that " `each case be decided upon its own 
particular facts and circumstances.' " McNemar, 91 F.3d at 
617 (quoting Scarano v. Central R.R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 
(3d Cir. 1953)). We stated that the application should not 
be formulaic, but should follow the framework set out in 
our decisions, most notably in Ryan Operations G.P. v. 
Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996). 
Looking at the framework developed by this court over time, 
we opined in McNemar that judicial estoppel may be 
invoked by a court at its discretion "to preserve the integrity 
of the judicial system by preventing parties from playing 
fast and loose with the courts in assuming inconsistent 
positions, and . . . with a recognition that each case must 
be decided upon its own particular facts and 
circumstances." McNemar, 91 F.3d at 617 (emphasis added). 
 
We made clear in Krouse that "courts should carefully 
adhere to the two-part test of Ryan Operations" before 
applying judicial estoppel. Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503 n.5. The 
Ryan Operations analysis requires a district court to make 
a determination on two threshold questions before applying 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We previously noted this in dicta in Krouse. In Krouse, we stated that 
the district courts in this circuit "should not assume that McNemar 
always bars an individual's ADA claims merely because prior 
representations or determinations of disability exist on the record." 
Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503 n.5. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also 
took notice of the explanatory effect of the Krouse opinion when it stated 
that in light of Krouse's discussion of McNemar, "it appears that no court 
of appeals has adopted the position that a plaintiff who has claimed total 
disability on a benefits application is per se estopped from claiming he 
could work with reasonable accommodations under the ADA." Talavera 
v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 129 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 
1997). 
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judicial estoppel. The questions are: (1) is the present 
position inconsistent with a position formerly asserted; and 
(2) if so, were either or both of the inconsistent positions 
asserted in bad faith with the intent to play "fast and loose 
with the court." Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 361; see also 
McNemar, 91 F.3d at 618. The District Court adhered to 
this framework when it analyzed the issues in this case. 
Following Krouse, the Supreme Court in Cleveland v. Policy 
Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999), explained 
how cases of this type should be handled, and it is that 
framework that we apply here. 
 
A. 
 
The first question we must address is whether the two 
positions taken by Motley are inconsistent. As the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Cleveland makes clear, each case 
should be decided on its unique facts. 
 
In Cleveland, the Supreme Court decided that the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals erred when it held that receipt of 
Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits 
automatically created a rebuttable presumption that the 
recipient was estopped from pursuing an ADA claim. See id. 
at 1599-1600. The Court held that while no presumption 
should be applied, to survive summary judgment, an ADA 
plaintiff "cannot simply ignore her SSDI contention that she 
was too disabled to work. . . . [S]he must explain why that 
SSDI contention is consistent with her ADA claim that she 
could `perform the essential functions' of her previous job, 
at least with `reasonable accommodation.' " Id. at 1600. 
 
The Supreme Court acknowledged, as do we, that a 
statement of total disability when applying for disability 
benefits may be a "context-related legal conclusion, namely 
`I am disabled for purposes of the [disability act].' " Id. at 
1601. The Court noted that there are situations in which a 
person may be disabled enough to qualify for receipt of 
disability benefits under SSDI, yet still be able to bring a 
cognizable ADA claim.4 In large part, this is because, when 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. To the extent that McNemar is unclear on this issue, we clarify today 
that, consistent with Cleveland and the rule that every case should be 
decided on its individual facts, there may be circumstances in which a 
party may pursue a successful ADA claim even after he has applied for 
disability benefits. 
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determining whether to award SSDI benefits, the possibility 
of reasonable accommodation is not taken into account. 
Under the ADA, however, a "qualified individual" includes 
all people who "can perform the essential functions" of the 
job "with or without reasonable accommodation." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12111(8). 
 
The Court also acknowledged that certain statements 
made during disability hearings may lead to generally 
applicable factual conclusions. Where factual 
inconsistencies between claims exist, as opposed to 
context-specific legal conclusions, the Court held that the 
law remains "where [it] found it." See Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. 
at 1601-02; Mitchell v. Washingtonville Central School Dist., 
190 F.3d 1, No. 98-7185, 1999 WL 627019, at *5-6 (2d Cir. 
Aug. 18, 1999) (publication page reference not available) 
(discussing Cleveland and holding that previous assertions 
made as part of disability claim that employee could not 
stand or walk were purely factual, so that "if the 
requirements for judicial estoppel are otherwise met, [the 
employee] may be prevented from claiming, as a factual 
matter, that he could [perform these physical activities] on 
the basis of prior factual assertions to the contrary."). 
 
The Supreme Court recognized that, although no 
presumption against recovery in an ADA suit exists, 
"[n]onetheless, in some cases an earlier SSDI claim may 
turn out genuinely to conflict with an ADA claim." 
Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1603. Recognizing the apparent 
contradiction that arises from an earlier application for 
disability benefits, the Court noted that the ADA plaintiff 
"must proffer a sufficient explanation" to resolve the 
contradiction. Id. 
 
In Cleveland, the ADA plaintiff had proffered a sufficient 
explanation of the difference in her statements. First, 
Cleveland noted that her initial statements were"made in 
a forum that does not consider the effect that reasonable 
workplace accommodations would have on the ability to 
work." Id. at 1604. Obviously, this is true in all of these 
cases and, if this argument alone allowed ADA plaintiffs 
who had previously applied for SSDI-type benefits to 
survive summary judgment, summary judgment could 
never be granted. Because the Supreme Court indicated 
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that summary judgment would indeed be appropriate in 
some cases, an ADA plaintiff must, in certain 
circumstances, provide some additional rationale to explain 
the plaintiff's apparent about-face concerning the extent of 
the injuries. Considering the different contexts in which the 
two statutory regimes operate could, of course, be crucial to 
understanding how an ADA plaintiff's particular claims 
may be reconciled. The additional justification presented by 
the plaintiff could, in theory, go into detail regarding the 
facts of his or her case, demonstrating how the differing 
statutory contexts makes their statements made under one 
scheme reconcilable with their claims under the other. As 
discussed below, however, such consideration does not help 
Motley. 
 
In Cleveland, the ADA plaintiff claimed that her 
statements were accurate "in the time period in which they 
were made." Id. So, in addition to noting that the statutory 
standards differed, Cleveland appears to have made a fact- 
based argument that her condition changed to some degree 
during the applicable time periods. This amounted to a 
sufficient explanation under the facts of Cleveland's case 
but, as we have said, each case must be decided on its 
unique facts. Although the presence of this additional 
justification distinguishes Cleveland's case from Motley's, 
this does not mean that Motley must demonstrate a change 
in his condition to avoid dismissal of his case. It does 
mean, however, that to avoid having his claim dismissed 
Motley's "explanation [of inconsistent positions] must be 
sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that, 
assuming the truth of or [his] good faith belief in the earlier 
statement, [he] could nonetheless perform the essential 
functions of [his] job, with or without reasonable 
accommodation." Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice & Procedure S 2732.3 (West Supp. 1999) 
(discussing Cleveland). Motley has failed to provide such a 
sufficient explanation, even taking into account the 
different standards used in his disability hearing and under 
the ADA. 
 
To establish that he was a "qualified individual with a 
disability" under the ADA and the comparable provisions of 
the NJLAD,5 Motley must be able to demonstrate that he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although an ADA suit revolves around whether the plaintiff has a 
"disability," 42 U.S.C. S 12102(2)(A), the NJLAD refers to "handicapped" 
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could perform the "essential functions" of a state trooper 
with or without reasonable accommodation. See  42 U.S.C. 
S 12111(8); Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 579 
(3d Cir. 1998). Therefore, it was the District Court's duty to 
decide whether Motley's earlier assertions when applying 
for disability benefits were inconsistent with this burden. 
After examining the specific facts of the case, the District 
Court found that Motley's present claim that he was able to 
perform the essential functions of his position with or 
without accommodation was "fundamentally inconsistent" 
with his earlier declaration that he was permanently and 
totally disabled and unable to work as a state police officer. 
 
Although courts should not assume that an individual's 
ADA claim is barred "merely because prior representations 
or disability exist on the record," Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503 
n.5, the attainment of disability benefits is certainly some 
evidence of an assertion that would be inconsistent with 
the argument that the party is a qualified individual under 
the ADA. Recognizing that this was the logical conclusion in 
these types of cases, the Supreme Court in Cleveland 
acknowledged that the ADA plaintiff must somehow explain 
the apparent inconsistency. Motley has failed to meet this 
burden. 
 
In his application for disability benefits, Motley averred 
that he was "permanently and totally disabled" as a result 
of the events of January 1990. (SA 11, SA 13) It is difficult 
to get around the conclusion that, in at least one of the 
fora, Motley was not completely honest. The statutes under 
which Motley pursued his disability benefits claim allow a 
disability pension to be awarded to an officer who is 
"physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
individuals. N.J.S.A. S 10:5-5(q). We have noted that the definitions of 
the two terms are different, most notably because the NJLAD definition 
of handicapped does not include the ADA's requirement that the 
condition substantially limit a major life activity. See Failla v. City of 
Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1998). We will concentrate on the 
ADA standard in our analysis because it is clear that if Motley's 
statements estopped him from claiming that he had a"disability"under 
the more stringent ADA standard, the statements would also estop him 
from claiming he was "handicapped" under the NJLAD. 
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duties in the Division of State Police." N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 53:5A-10(a). Nowhere in his application for the disability 
pension is there any indication that Motley could perform 
the essential functions of a state trooper, with or without 
accommodation. "Employers . . . are not required to find 
another job for an employee who is not qualified for the job 
he or she was doing." School Bd. of Nassau County v. 
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987). 
However, Motley did receive full pension benefits. 
 
Rather than a general allegation of disability, Motley 
offered detailed descriptions of his injuries and their impact 
on his ability to work. He claimed that he had sustained 
several debilitating injuries to support his claim of physical 
incapacitation in his application for disability benefits. He 
stated that he had "extremely painful and recurring 
headaches" and "intense back pain" when he sat for more 
than 20 minutes. (SA 15) In addition, Motley claimed that 
he had difficultly sleeping more than two to three hours 
because of the back pain. Furthermore, he asserted that he 
had "extreme pain" in his left knee and could not stand on 
it without pain. He also claimed to have "extreme difficulty 
with running." (SA 15) To receive the disability pension, 
Motley had to undergo an examination by a medical board. 
This board concurred with Motley's assertion that he was 
"totally and permanently incapacitated for state police 
officer duties." (SA15) Neither Motley nor the State Police 
contested this finding, which presumably took the 
fundamental job requirements for state police officers, along 
with reasonable accommodations such as light duty, into 
consideration when it chose to grant Motley full pension 
benefits. 
 
More important than the extent of Motley's injuries is his 
failure to proffer a reasonable explanation for his 
inconsistent statements. As we noted above, simply 
averring that the statutory schemes differ is not enough to 
survive summary judgment in light of Cleveland. An ADA 
plaintiff must offer a more substantial explanation to 
explain the divergent positions taken, or else summary 
judgment could never be granted. Motley has failed to bring 
any additional reasons for his conflicting answers to our 
attention. If anything, looking to the different statutory 
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schemes in this particular case convinces us that Motley's 
claims are, in fact, unreconcilable. The purpose of Motley's 
disability hearing was to determine whether he could 
continue to function as a state police officer. The resulting 
conclusion that he should be granted full pension benefits 
because his medical condition did not allow him to 
continue to serve is not one taken from some foreign 
context; it is directly relevant to Motley's claim that he was 
discriminated against when the New Jersey State Police 
failed to promote him. If Motley could not continue to serve 
because of his medical condition, it follows that he should 
not have been promoted for the same reason. Nonetheless, 
under Cleveland, we have given Motley an opportunity to 
explain how he can reconcile his two assertions. We do not 
believe the District Court erred by finding there is not 
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to do so. 
 
As noted above, to the extent that Motley now wishes to 
contest the purely factual findings regarding his physical 
condition, as opposed to conclusions that he was 
completely disabled for purposes of working as a state 
police officer, Cleveland does not even apply and Motley 
may be precluded from asserting such a claim. See 
Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1601-02; Mitchell, 190 F.3d at ___, 
1999 WL 627019, at *5-6. 
 
Motley's decision to rely solely on the differences in the 
statutory schemes is thus fatal to his ADA and NJLAD 
claims under the circumstances. There is undeniably a 
difference in the language of the various statutes; however, 
as McNemar indicated, focus on the differences in the 
statutory standards should not take precedence over a 
careful assessment of the nature of the prior assertions 
made by a party and their impact on the current claim. 
 
As the Supreme Court made clear in Cleveland, 119 S. 
Ct. at 1603-04, the mere fact that the statutory standards 
differ in some aspects does not mean that a prior assertion 
of permanent and total disability can never preclude a party 
from bringing a claim under the ADA. Cleveland holds 
simply that where context-related legal conclusions are 
involved, courts must not apply presumptions 
automatically without first considering whether the ADA 
plaintiff can reconcile the two apparently inconsistent 
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statutory claims. There may be cases where, looking at the 
previous facts and statements by a party, the assertions are 
such that the party cannot prove that he was a qualified 
individual because his previous statements take the 
position that he could not perform the essential functions 
of the job, with or without accommodation. That is the case 
here. 
 
Motley, relying on several specific and severe physical 
injuries, asserted that he was "permanently and totally 
disabled." This was not a mere blanket statement of 
complete disability checked on a box in order to obtain 
pension benefits. Rather, the assertion was supported by 
Motley's additional statements concerning the type and 
extent of his injuries. Furthermore, the medical board 
diagnosis, uncontested by Motley, also concluded that 
Motley was permanently incapacitated for police officer 
duties. On their face, these assertions are patently 
inconsistent with his present claims that he was a 
"qualified individual" under the ADA. 
 
Motley asserted that he was totally disabled so that he 
could receive special retirement benefits. After his 
retirement, he brought this claim, which necessarily relies 
on the fact that he was not totally disabled. Examining all 
the facts, we cannot say that the District Court erred when 
it concluded that the ADA case brought by Motley was 
inconsistent with his earlier statements regarding his 
disability. Thus, under Cleveland, the entry of summary 
judgment against Motley was proper. Our decision is based 
squarely on the standard set out by the Supreme Court in 
Cleveland. The difference between our position and that of 
the dissent is simply the fact-bound question of whether, 
under that standard, Motley was entitled to survive 
summary judgment. We hold that he was not. 
 
III. 
 
Because we find that the District Court did not err when 
it granted summary judgment against Motley in light of his 
prior assertions of complete disability, we affirm. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I agree with the majority's view that Cleveland v. Policy 
Management Sys. Corp., undercuts our previous decisions 
and replaces concepts of judicial estoppel and special legal 
presumptions with a straightforward test that is, in 
essence, nothing more than an application of normal 
summary judgment procedures when conflicting affidavits 
are presented in a case.1 Now, a plaintiff must reconcile or 
explain away the apparent conflict. 
 
In Cleveland, the Supreme Court gave Ms. Cleveland an 
opportunity to do so, remanding so "[t]he parties [would] 
have the opportunity in the trial court to present, or to 
contest, these explanations, in sworn form where 
appropriate." Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1604 (1999).2 
However, we have denied Mr. Motley his day in court based 
on our view that he would not be able to satisfactorily 
explain away the inconsistency between his two statements. 
 
I take issue with our ruling for two reasons: 
 
First, I think that, after Cleveland, we should remand in 
cases such as this to provide all plaintiffs in Mr. Motley's 
position with the opportunity to explain away the 
inconsistency, if they can do so, and to be subject to cross 
examination, rather than reaching our own conclusions 
from the record.3 The procedure set forth in Cleveland 
requires no less. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In Cleveland, the Supreme Court explained: 
 
       When faced with a plaintiff 's previous sworn statement asserting 
       "total disability" or the like, the court should require an 
explanation 
       of any apparent inconsistency with the necessary elements of an 
       ADA claim. To defeat summary judgment, that explanation must be 
       sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that, 
assuming 
       the truth of, or the plaintiff's good faith belief in, the earlier 
       statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless "perform the essential 
       functions" of her job, with or without "reasonable accommodations." 
 
Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1604. 
 
2. Contrary to the majority's statement regarding the holding of 
Cleveland, the Supreme Court did not find her explanation "sufficient" to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, it remanded to test the 
sufficiency of the statement. See Cleveland , 119 S. Ct. at 1604. 
3. In the post-Cleveland decision of Mitchell v. Washingtonville Central 
School Dist., ___ F.3d ___, No. 98-7185, 1999 WL 627019 (2d Cir. Aug. 
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Once the plaintiff has made an apparently inconsistent 
statement, the defendant challenges this contrary assertion 
as a defense, and in order to survive summary judgment, 
the plaintiff must come forward with an explanation. It is 
not for the court upon the defendant's raising of this 
inconsistency, to decide on its own whether the 
inconsistency can be reconciled. How can we, now, after 
Cleveland, deny this opportunity which is clearly 
mandated? 
 
In Cleveland, the explanations offered in plaintiff 's brief 
on appeal consisted not only of statutory differences, but 
also included an allegation that plaintiff 's condition had 
improved over time so that the earlier statements were true 
when made. See id. Although this would seem to be a 
satisfactory explanation, the Supreme Court did not reverse 
outright, but, rather, remanded the case for determination 
as to the sufficiency of the explanation. See id. In doing so, 
it did no more than permit the normal procedure to unfold, 
that is, as it outlined in explaining the way these situations 
should be handled, plaintiff must be given the opportunity 
to explain away. 
 
Here, we err not only in deciding the issue, but, even 
more, we err by deciding it based upon the record made 
when the rules of the game were very different. The District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18, 1999) (to be reported at 190 F.3d 1), the Second Circuit came to its 
own conclusion regarding plaintiff 's ability to perform the essential 
functions of a position with or without a reasonable accommodation. The 
plaintiff had previously stated that he could not engage in any gainful 
employment and, specifically, could not stand or ambulate for any 
prolonged period. The court, finding that standing and walking were 
essential functions of the position in question, and holding that the 
principles of judicial estoppel applied to those factual assertions, 
affirmed the district court's conclusion that the plaintiff could not 
establish a prima facie case. Our case is clearly distinguishable from 
Mitchell's. Here, the District Court's determination that Motley was 
judicially estopped rested solely upon Motley's legal conclusions rather 
than his factual assertions. Furthermore, courts should not use the 
disability description normally set forth in an application for benefits, 
without more, as a bar unless the result is clear. To do similarly 
deprives 
litigants any opportunity to explain. 
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Court decided this issue in the context of a body of law that 
did not permit any explanation of the inconsistency, and 
certainly did not require the proffer of an explanation. In 
McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., this Court wrote: 
 901<!>"McNemar's statements on his disability benefits 
 
application are unconditional assertions as to his disability; 
he should not now be permitted to qualify those statements 
where the application itself is unequivocal." McNemar v. 
Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting 
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1351, 1358 (D. 
Kan. 1995) (internal quotations omitted).4  
 
The District Court never considered any explanation, and 
the parties' discovery and arguments were clearly 
uninformed as to the need for an explanation. To now cull 
the existing record to make the argument, and resolve it in 
favor of the defendant under a new set of rules, is unfair. 
See Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 824 (3d Cir. 
1985); see also U.S. v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1103 n.23 
(3d Cir. 1990). I would therefore remand for plaintiff to 
proffer his explanation, with the opportunity for the parties 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. I recognize that in Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 726 F.3d 494, 
503 
n.5 (3d 1997) we subsequently explained that McNemar ought not be 
read as a per se bar of ADA claims. However, McNemar's skepticism 
remained the law of this circuit until Cleveland  and the District Court 
relied upon McNemar in its description of the law and its analysis of this 
case. The District Court wrote: 
 
       Mr. Motley's assertions of permanent and total disability and 
       inability to work are fundamentally inconsistent with his current 
       position that at all material times with or without accommodation 
       he was able to perform the essential functions of his position. 
       Counsel for Mr. Motley noted both in the papers submitted and at 
       oral argument of September 8, 1997 that he never specifically 
       claimed to be disabled in August 1991 when he was to be 
       considered for a promotion. However, his declaration that he is 
       totally and permanently disabled include the August 1991 time 
       period. In addition, he certified that he has not performed regular 
       duty since the traumatic event. Accordingly, because Mr. Motley has 
       asserted fundamentally inconsistent positions, thefirst part of the 
       test for judicial estoppel is met. 
 
Motley v. New Jersey State Police, No. 96-419, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 9, 1997). 
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to offer evidence and cross-examine on this issue, as the 
Supreme Court did in Cleveland.5  
 
Second, I read the record here as not being nearly as 
one-sided as the majority views it, and I believe that there 
are, at least, genuine issues of fact regarding what 
Mr. Motley can and cannot do, and issues as to how his 
statements should be interpreted. The majority notes some 
of the record regarding Mr. Motley's situation, but there is 
much more. I believe the majority places too much weight 
on the findings of the medical board, ignores the questions 
raised by Motley's second benefits application, and, most 
importantly, fails to consider the factual record regarding 
the extent of his service and duties, after his injury, for 
which he received commendations. 
 
It is clear from his work reviews, as it is from his 
amended application for benefits, that Motley had indeed 
been working consistently as a detective ever since his 
injury. In fact, Motley did so in superior fashion. He 
remained on full-duty for the purposes of his reviews, see 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. I note in passing that the majority opinion seems to equivocate 
somewhat with respect to the type of explanation that will suffice -- 
whether statutory differences can be, in and of themselves, enough. 
While we do not clearly state that they can be, I think that Cleveland 
does so state, and I will construe the majority opinion to so provide. See 
Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1604 (stating that the plaintiff raised the 
difference between the statutes and the accuracy of her statements at 
the times they were made as explanations and remanding for 
consideration of "these explanations"). Obviously, however, a statutory 
difference does not exist in the abstract. Rather, reliance on different 
standards as an explanation must be supported with relevant facts -- for 
instance, if someone is disabled for purposes of a retirement disability 
pension because he cannot perform the "usual duties" that a superior 
would assign, he must explain how he could perform the "essential 
functions with accommodation," relating these differences to specific 
facts as to what he can and cannot do in connection with his 
employment, and how accommodation would make a difference in his 
job performance. As noted above, Cleveland states: "To defeat summary 
judgment, that explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable 
juror's concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff 's good 
faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless 
`perform the essential functions' of her job, with or without `reasonable 
accommodations.' " Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1604. 
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PA 42, and received exemplary performance evaluations 
and several commendations. See PA 85-100. 6 Motley 
participated in complex investigations requiring undercover 
work, expert surveillance, and execution of search warrants 
in potentially dangerous situations. See id. Unlike in 
Mitchell v. Washingtonville Central School Dist., ___ F.3d ___, 
No. 98-7185, 1999 WL 627019 (2d Cir. Aug. 18, 1999) (to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For instance, from May 1, 1990 to October 31, 1990, Mr. Motley 
"functioned in an undercover capacity, a surface investigation and as 
part of a surveillance team operating in a primarily Hispanic 
neighborhood," and was "injected into emergent investigations involving 
lengthy and complicated affidavits for search warrants," which he 
prepared and executed. See PA 87-88. From November 1, 1990 to April 
30, 1991, Mr. Motley was assigned to the Narcotics North Unit and the 
Patrol Response Unit, in both an undercover and surface investigative 
capacity. He received a commendation for his work with the Patrol 
Response Unit during this time period, for his participation in the 
seizure of $4.5 million. See PA 89. From May 1, 1991 to April 30, 1994, 
he was assigned to the newly created C.E.R.B. North Unit, Squad 2, 
where he investigated "diverse criminal cases," such as narcotics, 
loansharking, and racketeering, in both undercover and surface 
investigative capacities. See PA 91. During this time period, he received 
a Performance Notice commending him for his actions when he was 
confronted while working undercover by five subjects, two of them 
armed. See PA 94. He also received commendations for his participation 
in the installation of an electronic surveillance device, the arrest of 
members of a Jamaican Posse, and a joint investigation resulting in a 
major cocaine seizure. See PA 94, 96-97, 99. 
 
Further, Mr. Motley's performance evaluations during the time period 
after he was injured were consistently positive. For instance, the 
evaluation report covering the time period from November 1, 1989 to 
April 1, 1990, concluded that Mr. Motley "perform[ed] his duties in an 
excellent and professional manner." PA 85. It also noted that "[h]e 
willingly accepts responsibilities and maintains a strong desire to 
produce a quality work product," and "exceeds in enthusiasm, has good 
initiative, is aggressive, professional and maintains an excellent spirit 
of 
cooperation with his peers and other law enforcement agencies 
concerned with narcotic enforcement." Id. Mr. Motley was also described 
in various evaluation reports spanning the time period from November 1, 
1989 to April 30, 1994, as "very proficient," "very resourceful," 
"thoroughly knowledgeable," "a valuable asset," "a positive role model," 
"conscientious," "self-motivated," "perform[ing] well under stressful 
situations," and "display[ing] a high degree of competence." PA 86-87, 
90, 92, 94-95. 
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be reported at 190 F.3d 1), the record does not support the 
conclusion that Motley's injuries necessarily prevented him 
from fulfilling the essential functions of a police officer with 
or without an accommodation. Reading the facts in the 
record in the light most favorable to Motley, as we must, 
the record suggests the opposite. 
 
The majority explains that his applications for benefits 
were bereft of any indication that he could perform the 
essential functions of his job, and were more than a 
blanket statement of "total disability" because they were 
supported by a description of his injuries. This is 
misleading. His amended application, admittedlyfiled after 
his original application was approved,7  clearly states: "Since 
the event, I have been on light duty." See  SA 12. 
Furthermore, the majority does not consider that the 
benefit application asks for a description of his injuries, 
which he gave, noting that the experiences caused pain. 
Lastly, the majority misreads the findings of the medical 
board.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Motley first filed for benefits in April 1993. By letter dated February 
3, 
1994, he was informed that his application was approved. In his first 
application, Motley answered "No" to the question: "Have you performed 
regular duty since the traumatic event?" See  SA 14. In his amended 
application, filed on March 15, 1994, six weeks after his original 
application was granted and six weeks before hefirst received benefits, 
Motley answered the same question by writing that he had "been on light 
duty" since the event. See SA 12. In his reply brief, the Appellant states 
that the new application was filed because Motley realized the first 
application was not completely accurate. Appellee's brief does not 
discuss the amended application. 
 
8. The majority asserts: "Neither Motley nor the State Police contested 
[the medical board's] finding which presumably took the fundamental job 
requirements for state police officers, along with reasonable 
accommodations such as light duty, into consideration when it chose to 
grant Motley full pension benefits." This presumption is unfounded, and 
the majority provides no authority for its conclusion. The conclusion is 
tantamount to determining that no statutory explanation is possible in 
this case. 
 
Furthermore, comparison between N.J. Stat. Ann. 53:5A-10(a) -- 
applicable here -- and 53:5A-9(a) suggests that the majority's broad 
reading of the medical board's findings is not supportable. Section 
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It is worth remembering that Motley did not retire from 
the police department solely because his pain made 
working difficult. He retired after he became frustrated with 
the police force's refusal to consider him for promotion to 
Detective I. Due to the medical status he was assigned, 
Motley was not permitted to take the police force's physical 
exam. He therefore effectively became ineligible for 
promotion although he worked at such a high level and 
received glowing reviews, and even though police internal 
operating procedures held open the possibility that the 
eligibility of temporarily disabled individuals would be 
considered by the Superintendent on a case-by-case basis. 
See S.O.P. C-20(H)(2)(a). Motley did not suffer his 
frustration in silence. He filed a grievance in August 1991 
complaining of his denial of promotion because of the 
physical exam, and submitted a request for a case-by-case 
determination by the Superintendent in November 1993 
before resigning effective May 1994. 
 
Accordingly, I would remand to the District Court for 
reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment in light 
of Cleveland. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
53:5A-9(a), which deals with general disabilities rather than those 
arising from an event occurring during performance of police duties, 
requires that the: "medical board ... certify that such member is mentally 
or physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual duty and of 
any other available duty in the Division of State Police which the 
Superintendent of State Police is willing to assign him." N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 53:5A-9(a) (West 1999) (emphasis added). This additional phrase, "of 
any other available duty", not contained in 53:5A-10(a), may be 
important to our understanding of 53:5A-10)(a). The New Jersey Superior 
Court has interpreted 53:5A-9(a) to require the determination of whether 
there are assignments that the plaintiff could perform which "could 
reasonably made available to him," Crain v. State of New Jersey, 584 
A.2d 863, 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991), before requiring benefits under 
that section, and an Administrative Law Judge has suggested that the 
reasonable accommodation standard of the ADA provided the best 
analogy to the standard announced in Crain. See Ward v. Board of 
Trustees of the Police and Fireman Retirement Sys., 1999 WL 160596 
(N.J. Admin. Feb. 10, 1999) (publication page reference not available). 
The section that applies here has no corresponding language, and 
should not be read to support the presumption that accommodation 
entered into the medical board's thinking, let alone its finding. 
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